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ABSTRACT
Network security is typically reactive: Networks provide
connectivity and subsequently alter this connectivity accord-
ing to various security policies, as implemented in middle-
boxes, or at higher layers. This approach gives rise to com-
plicated interactions between protocols and systems that can
cause incorrect behavior and slow response to attacks. In
this paper, we propose a proactive approach to securing net-
works, whereby security-related actions (e.g., dropping or
redirecting traffic) are embedded into the network fabric it-
self, leaving only a fixed set of actions to higher layers. We
explore this approach in the context of network access con-
trol. Our design uses programmable switches to manipulate
traffic at lower layers; these switches interact with policy
and monitoring at higher layers. We apply our approach to
Georgia Tech’s network access control system, show how
the new design can both overcome the current shortcomings
and provide new security functions, describe our proposed
deployment, and discuss open research questions.
1. Introduction
Enterprise networks host many potentially untrusted de-
vices. These devices are dynamic, increasingly heteroge-
neous, and vulnerable to compromise. The increasing com-
plexity of communications networks posed by the grow-
ing number of devices, applications, middleboxes, and traf-
fic types—coupled with users’ demands for secure, highly
available networks—has made operating and maintaining
networks extremely challenging.
Today’s network layer enables connectivity but does not
provide any mechanisms for directly implementing security
policies. As such, security is typically an afterthought, em-
bodied by middleboxes, authentications, alert systems, and
intrusion detection systems. This post hoc approach to se-
curity creates a plethora of independently (and often hard-
to-manage) devices that may interact in unexpected ways re-
sulting in weaker security or incorrect operation (e.g., mis-
configuration) [4]. For example, network admission control
on the Georgia Tech campus network involves interaction
between firewalls, dynamic address (DHCP) servers, virtual
LANs, and intrusion detection systems, not to mention the
switches and routers themselves [13]. As we will see, the in-
teraction between these many “moving parts” creates a sys-
tem that is brittle and unresponsive in the face of various
security threats. This paper explores the following question:
Instead of deploying a collection of point solutions in the
network, could security policies be integrated into the net-
work fabric itself?
Extending the metaphor of a network operating system [8]
to the design of secure networks, we draw inspiration
from the design of secure software and operating systems,
whereby systems are built from, small, hardened, trusted
components. Our design aims to imbue the network layer
itself with the basic functions needed to implement security
policies, as well as a control interface that allows the appro-
priate level of control to higher layers that wish to express
those policies or explicitly control traffic. For example, con-
sider the case of quarantining an infected host: This task
currently requires network administrators to (1) install on-
path firewalls that perform on-path inspection of traffic; and
(2) manually update firewall rules when intrusion detection
systems raise alarms. Instead, we advocate decoupling the
tasks of monitoring and control, performing distributed in-
ference and monitoring and detection using existing subsys-
tems that can monitor traffic at higher layers and detect com-
promised hosts (e.g., [7,11]) and then push control resulting
from this inference into the network fabric itself by altering
how the network switches themselves forward traffic.
Several recent trends make this refactoring possible: First,
programmable (and software-based) network devices [3,10]
allow more direct, fine-grained control over traffic in the net-
work. At first blush, programmable network devices might
seem to present yet another source of complexity, yet we be-
lieve that this programmability actually presents an oppor-
tunity to proactively secure the network layer. Second, dis-
tributed network monitoring algorithms have improved sig-
nificantly in their ability to quickly and accurately correlate
traffic from many distinct (and often distributed) sources to
detect coordinated attacks (e.g., for detecting botnets [7] and
spammers [11]). Finally, recent network designs that cen-
tralize some aspects of network control [5, 6] allow us to
make some aspects of security inherent to the network itself.
In this paper, we study this approach in the context of a
specific—and initially modest—network security task: Net-
work admission control and monitoring. Rather than apply-
ing security functions at higher layers, we control connec-
tivity at the lowest possible layer, using policies installed in
programmable switches by a controller. The controller inter-
acts directly with the switches, thus simplifying complicated
distributed configuration tasks and possibly even eliminat-
ing “security middleboxes” altogether. The switches interact
with monitoring subsystems through a controller that allows
an operator to quarantine hosts or subsets of traffic whenever
a compromise is detected. To the best of our knowledge,
none of the campus networks today allow dynamic configu-
ration of network policies based on integration with monitor-
ing systems. We expect that, by decoupling security policies
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Figure 1: Current START Architecture.
from the implementation of these policies in the switches
themselves, our design will not only simplify the implemen-
tation of network security policies, but also allow for more
fine-grained security policies and a wider range of features.
Our proposed design presents many research challenges.
First, the system must support a large number of users and
traffic flows: The residential network alone on the Georgia
Tech network has 16,000 active users. The system must pro-
vide flexibility and dynamic control, without storing a pro-
hibitive amount of state at the switches themselves or intro-
ducing excessive delays on packet forwarding. Second, the
controller and programmable switches must be integrated
with real-time monitoring and alert systems; the controller
must be able to quickly correlate and synthesize alerts and
quickly send control messages to switches to affect traffic
flows. Finally, the controller channel must be secure: the
controller and switch interfaces must be robust to attack, and
the control channel between the controller and the devices
themselves must be available and secure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents background on OpenFlow and an overview of the
current authentication infrastructure on the Georgia Tech
campus network. Section 3 describes the proposed design,
and Section 4 describes our deployment plan. Section 5
presents related work, and Section 6 concludes with a sum-
mary and research agenda.
2. Background
We describe the network admission control problem and
introduce OpenFlow [10], an interface for programmable
switches on which we base our design.
2.1 Network Access Control and Monitoring
Campus and enterprise networks are often large, heteroge-
neous, and unmanageable. Thus, network administration can
be both troublesome, manual, and error-prone. Network ad-
ministrators encounter often situations where machines are
infected or compromised. Today, the network operator must
manually remove or quarantine the machine from the net-
work, which is tedious. A network admission control sys-
tem should be able to offer flexible, fast control over net-
work traffic while also scaling to a large number of users
and traffic flows. To the extent possible, network manage-
ment should also be automated, to ease the burden on the
network administrators.
2.1.1 Current system overview
Figure 1 shows the current START architecture [13], the
authentication system deployed in the Georgia Tech Cam-
pus. It is currently based on virtual LANs (VLANs) and
VLAN Management Policy Server (VMPS) [15] and pro-
vides for dynamic network assignment that allows users to
be placed on a separate network for authentication, scanning,
and access to software update services to correct any prob-
lems discovered during the scan. After a client is authen-
ticated and passes these tests, the system migrates a client
to the regular VLAN with full network access and gives the
client a public IP address. The START system supports the
following functions:
Registration The registration system provides the Web in-
terface to the backend registration database, DHCP, DNS,
authentication and updates for external systems. The Web
interface guides users through the registration process. The
DNS server for the network is a custom application written
in perl. It returns the IP address for the registration server
for all DNS queries, except for a list of domains needed for
updating workstations (e.g., windowsupdate.com). Two in-
stances of the DHCP server are run: One for the unregistered
VLAN, and one for the registered VLAN. Each instance
has its own configuration files that are created automatically
from data in the registration system’s database.
Initial Scanning During the registration process, systems
are scanned for known vulnerabilities. If the scan reveals
vulnerabilities, the user is presented with these vulnerabili-
ties and given an opportunity to update the system. The fire-
wall for the network allows traffic to get to the appropriate
update servers for Microsoft and Apple.
Firewall The registration VLAN uses a firewall to block net-
work traffic to unregistered desktops. However, the firewall
allows Web and secure Web (i.e., port 80 and 443) traffic to
pass so that desktop machines can reach update sites.
Various routers and switches are employed to facilitate
creating the VLANs necessary for the needed networks. The
local switches determine which VLAN for each machine
that joins the network. The switch will download VLAN
maps periodically from a VMPS. Unknown MAC addresses
are assigned to the unregistered VLAN and known MAC ad-
dresses are placed onto the appropriate subnet. VMPS peri-
odically downloads the VLAN maps from the registration
server. Network security is enforced by creating ARP tables
that map each MAC address to its registered IP and pushing
that table to each router.
2.1.2 Problems with the current design
The current architecture has several shortcomings:
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1. Access control is too coarse-grained. START
deploys two different VLANs to separate in-
fected/compromised machines from healthy machines.
This segregation results in all compromised hosts re-
siding on a single VLAN; such a configuration does
not provide proper isolation, since these infected hosts
are not isolated from each other. Additionally, rely-
ing on VLANs makes the system inflexible and less
configurable, because VLANs typically map hosts to
network segments according to MAC address, not ac-
cording to individual flows.
2. Hosts cannot be dynamically remapped to different
portions of the network. In the current configuration,
when a machine is mapped to a different part of the
network, it must be rebooted to ensure that it receives
a public IP address, which is inconvenient because it
relies on user intervention.
3. Monitoring is not continuous. Authentication and
scanning only occur when a network device is initially
introduced; if the device is subsequently compromised
(or otherwise becomes the source of unwanted traf-
fic), it cannot be dynamically remapped to the garden-
walled portion of the network.
Many of the current shortcomings result from the fact that
security functions have been added on top of the existing net-
work infrastructure. This design was natural when switches
needed to be treated as “black boxes”; however, switch ven-
dors have begun to expose a standard interface, OpenFlow,
whereby an external controller can affect the way a switch
forwards traffic. This additional facility at the switches
themselves offers the opportunity for placing more security
functions at lower layers of the network stack. We briefly
summarize the OpenFlow architecture below.
2.2 OpenFlow
OpenFlow-enabled switches expose an open protocol for
programming the flow table and taking actions based on en-
tries in these flow tables. The basic architecture consists of a
switch, a centralized controller, and end-hosts. Typically, a
single controller communicates with multiple switches. The
switch and the controller communicate over a secure channel
using the standardized OpenFlow control protocol, which
can affect flow table entries on the switch. Currently, all
OpenFlow switches support the following policies:
1. Forward this flow’s packets to a given port or ports.
This function allows packets to be forwarded.
2. Encapsulate and forward this flow’s packets to a con-
troller. In this case, the packet is delivered to a secure
channel, where it is encapsulated and sent to a con-
troller. This function may typically be used for the first
packet in a new flow, so a controller can decide if the
flow should be added to the flow table.
3. Drop this flow’s packets. This operation can be used
to restrict access, to curb denial of service attacks, or to















Figure 2: OpenFlow-based START Architecture.
In most switches, these functions should operate at line rate.
Upon receiving the first packet from an unknown sender, the
switch sends the packet back to the controller. The controller
then decides how to forward the packet and communicates
this information back to the switch. Thus, the OpenFlow
interface provides dynamic remote control of the switches.
3. Design
In this section, we push security functions into network
switches to improve network access control and monitor-
ing. We describe our approach to integrating network-layer
access control into switches themselves, including a revi-
sion to the current architecture based on OpenFlow-enabled
switches and a centralized controller. We then explain how
this new network layer can expose functions to higher layers
that can implement more complex policies. We describe how
this design enables fine-grained, dynamic control over traffic
for implementing security policies, as well as how it simpli-
fies network design by eliminating on-path middleboxes that
implement security policies at higher layers.
3.1 Network-Layer Access Control
Figure 2 shows an OpenFlow-enabled network that can
support security functions such as access control at the
switches themselves. When a device first connects, it broad-
casts a DHCP “discover” message. The DHCP server sends
back a public IP address to the machine. To gain access to
the wide-area Internet, the machine must authenticate itself
via the START Web service; OpenFlow-enabled switches
can redirect all HTTP requests from unauthenticated ma-
chines to the START Web site by default. Once a user au-
thenticates the machine, the Web service saves the MAC ad-
dress of the machine and updates flow table entries to allow
access to a restricted set of destinations (e.g., Microsoft Up-
date). At this point, a scanner examines the device for poten-
tial infections. If the machine passes the scan, the START
Web service sends a request to controller to permit traffic
from this machine to be forwarded to any destination. The
network performs continual scanning of hosts, using dis-
tributed inference techniques (some of which we describe
in more detail in Section 3.2. If the machine is later found to
infected, then it is quarantined.
The controller maintains a state machine for every MAC
address of machines connected to the network. Here, we
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will describe what policies are required for each state. Ev-
ery machine can reside in one of three states. Either it can
be in registration state, or monitoring state, or quarantined
state. In the registration state, the machine is in the process
of authenticating itself to the web service. The monitoring
state enables the monitoring softwares to pro-actively detect
infected machines in the network and send updates to the
controller. We plan to deploy BotMiner for Bot monitoring
and SNARE/SpamTracker for spam. In the third state, which
is the quarantined state, the machine is firewalled and denied
access to the Internet.
Registration state When the switch receives a packet from a
machine for which it has no flow table entry, it forwards the
packet to the controller. The controller maintains a database
of authenticated machines, as well as the flow-table entries
associated with them. The following flow policies are then
sent to switch:
1. Drop all packets other than HTTP, DHCP and ARP.
2. Broadcast all DHCP and ARP packets.
3. Allow HTTP traffic to update sites.
4. Forward other HTTP requests to the Web service.
Operation State In addition to the normal forwarding poli-
cies, the controller also receives updates from network mon-
itors about the IP addresses of infected (or otherwise mis-
behaving) hosts. The following policies are implemented in
this state:
1. Forward all packets using normal routing.
2. If the controller receives an update about an infected
host, it moves that host to the quarantined or registra-
tion state and updates switch flow tables accordingly.
Quarantine State In the quarantined state, the host is essen-
tially disconnected from the network:
1. Drop all packets coming from the machine based on
the MAC address.
2. Upon HTTP request, return Web page to client inform-
ing the user of the infection.
The controller manages the state of each machine and up-
dates the flow table entries in the switches accordingly.
3.2 Exposing Control to Higher Layers
The architecture implements security functions at lower
layers on the switches themselves, exposing only a standard
control interface to higher layers where more sophisticated
policies can be expressed. Instead of manipulating traffic di-
rectly, higher layers and other components such as alert sys-
tems only control traffic via the standard, narrow OpenFlow-
based switch interface.
This refactoring keeps on-path forwarding decisions sim-
ple, while still allowing complex policies to be implemented
through a standard control interface. One of the areas where
this separation of control facilitates more complex policies
Figure 3: Research Testbed.
is continuous monitoring, and, in particular, distributed in-
ference (particularly using information gleaned from pro-
tocols at higher layers). Whereas today’s networks com-
pletely decouple monitoring from lower-layer traffic control,
the proposed approach allows switches to dynamically re-
map clients based on input from higher layers (e.g., alarms
from distributed network monitoring systems, such as Bot-
Miner [7] and SpamTracker [11]).
4. Planned Deployment and Evaluation
In this section, we describe the initial research testbed on
which we plan to deploy a prototype implementation of the
OpenFlow-based network access control system.
Research Testbed Figure 3 illustrates the initial deployment
platform that we are already building to test the OpenFlow-
based START architecture. The deployment is a dedicated
network that is physically separate from the production net-
work and yet has its own IP prefix and upstream connec-
tivity. It consists of five OpenFlow-enabled switches: two
Quanta QSSC LB4G 48x1GB switches connected on a com-
mon VLAN (one in the Klaus Computing building, and one
in the Georgia Tech Technology Square Research Build-
ing), each with a 10GB copper uplink connecting machines
from two research labs, as well as experimental network de-
vices; one HP ProCurve 48x1GB switch deployed in the
Georgia Tech Research NOC (RNOC) [12]; one OpenFlow-
enabled 4x1GB NetFPGA switch, running in a Dell Pow-
erEdge 2950; and one Linux reference implementation of
OpenFlow, with a 4-port NIC running in a Dell PowerEdge
1950. This platform will allow us to deploy and test our new
architecture before deploying it on the production network.
Campus Deployment The physical network currently sup-
ported by START was recently upgraded to include approx-
imately 275 HP switches; these switches are capable of sup-
porting the OpenFlow firmware once the architecture is ul-
timately deployed on the campus network. One of the more
significant practical challenges in the campus deployment
will be straining the scalability of the system on a produc-
tion network without disrupting connectivity. For example,
the proposed architecture may involve installing many flow
table entries in the switches, which may either exhaust mem-
ory or slow lookup performance if entries are not stored effi-
ciently, or if state is not offloaded to the controller whenever
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possible. To address this concern, we will first stress-test the
design on the research testbed and subsequently the archi-
tecture on a smaller number of production switches before
completely rolling out the architecture on all 275 switches.
5. Related Work
Our architecture relies on flow-based operation, as advo-
cated by OpenFlow [10], which has origins in the designs
of earlier protocols, such as ATM [9, 14], and even early
programmable switch architectures. We also draw inspira-
tion from 4D [6] and Ethane [1], both of which advocate
controlling network switches from a separate, logically cen-
tralized system. Although our approach is similar in spirit
to these previous efforts that separate control from switches,
we explore how this refactoring can help improve on and
generalize existing security functions that already exist at
higher layers and in middleboxes. For example, whereas an
Ethane controller acts primarily as an intermediary for con-
trolling traffic between hosts on an enterprise network, our
approach explores how more complex security policies and
actions (e.g., actions based on alerts from distributed detec-
tion systems) could be more directly integrated into the net-
work fabric and thus possibly allow significantly more dy-
namic, fine-grained, and flexible security policies than are
feasible today.
NOX is a recently proposed “network operating system”
that provides a uniform, centralized programmatic interface
for a network [8]. Whereas NOX provides a platform for
experimentation and research with new protocols, our pro-
posed architecture should improve security by embedding
security into the network itself. NOX could serve as a plat-
form which we could use as the basis for our architecture.
Recent trends in packet forwarding architectures (e.g., [2])
have tried to achieve a similar shift towards the lower layers
by having the software part of the switch take the decisions
of forwarding and pass it on to the hardware. Typically, the
software and the hardware reside on the same machine. But,
with such an architecture, its difficult to embed intelligent
capabilities into the software, since there is no central ag-
gregation of network-wide data. With our design, the cen-
tral controller can do all the processing of the data collected
from the monitors and send back the flow decisions to the
switches through a fixed protocol.
6. Research Agenda
Today, we can only imagine very coarse-grained configu-
ration changes like moving a user to the quarantine VLAN
or a private VLAN. The proposed design that pushes secu-
rity down the network protocol stack potentially simplifies
many network security functions, and also allows dynamic,
fine-grained security policies that may make it possible to
eliminate dedicated intrusion prevention systems at higher
layers altogether. We anticipate that as we build this system,
we will encounter various research challenges. In our ongo-
ing research, we are grappling with the following issues:
Scale and Performance When deploying the architecture
on the campus network, we expect to encounter numerous
challenges involving scalability. For example, the Georgia
Tech residential network must support approximately 16,000
users; the portion of the campus that runs START comprises
more than 13,000 network ports, and future plans include
expanding START to more than 40,000 active ports across
academic buildings and merging START with the (separate)
access control system currently used for the campus wireless
network. A significant challenge will be implementing dy-
namic, fine-grained policies with flow-table entries, without
exhausting switch memory or slowing forwarding. Recent
proposals for optimizing customizable forwarding [2] may
offer a useful starting point.
Integration with Monitoring As previously mentioned, the
current network access control system scans hosts when they
are first introduced into the network but cannot re-assign
these hosts to different networks when they are deemed to
be compromised. In our ongoing work, we will integrate
alarms that arise from distributed monitoring and inference
into mechanisms that can affect traffic flows more directly.
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